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The principal problem in understanding the actions of men is to understand 
how they think--how their minds work. 
--P. W. Bridgman. Reflections of a Physicist. 
INTRODUCTION 
For centuries discussions about informal finance have been filled with confusion and 
controversy (Nelson).1 Moralists condemn it, politicians attempt to control and regulate 
it, sociologists debate its usefulness, economists dissect it looking for imperfections--while, 
billions of people voluntarily participate in it. Fashioning a composite picture of informal 
finance is similar to summing the disjointed reports of judgmental blind people who have 
independently felt an elephant's appendage; the parts depicted do not add to a coherent 
whole. 
1Formal finance is here defined as those financial contracts that are sanctioned and 
supervised by government organizations, such as central banks, ministries of finance, or 
superintendents of banks. Semi-formal finance is provided by entities that operate under 
government charter but transact financial contracts with little or no government supervision. 
Informal finance encompasses all other financial lending and deposit taking that occurs 
outside government sanction or supervision, aside from general rules that apply to fulfilling 
contracts. 
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This confusion justifies looking for new ways of analyzing informal finance, ways that 
do not prejudge the virtue of the activities and people involved, that employ common units 
of analysis, and that also apply research techniques representing the manner in which people 
make decisions. I propose using contracts as a framework for such analysis. Because of my 
professional interests I stress their economic aspects. 
BACKGROUND ON CONTRACTS 
The use of contracts in economic analysis germinated in institutional economics and 
later blossomed in the study of labor arrangements (Commons; Rosen). Interest in contracts 
has reemerged recently in new institutional economics where transaction costs are 
emphasized (Williamson), in principal agent analysis (Ross), and in the study of asymmetric 
information (Akerloff). Literature on this topic has expanded to include implicit contracts 
(Rosen), incomplete contracts (Hart and Holmstrom), and incentive contracts (Cheung). 
The analysis has also been extended to include studies of land tenure and credit (Braverman 
and Stiglitz; Stiglitz and Weiss). 
Contracts can be used to describe multifaceted agreements between individuals or 
firms. They may involve explicit as well as implicit stipulations, they may be written or oral, 
and they may include few or many elements (Mahoney). Formal financial contracts are 
often written and contain mostly explicit stipulations, while their informal counterparts tend 
more often to be oral and involve implicit elements. Some contracts can be enforced in 
courts of law, while others are enforceable only through social sanctions (Galanter). In the 
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discussion that follows I argue for thinking of contracts as being the products that are made 
and handled by financial intermediation, particularly in informal finance. 
In neoclassical economics transactions between individuals are assumed to occur 
under simple terms; in a cash transaction the vendor contracts to sell a certain amount of 
a good at a price to the buyer and the exchange takes place quickly. Economists usually 
ignore that a contract is involved in these exchanges because the terms are implied rather 
than written, the transaction is impersonal and takes place instantaneously, and the contract 
is enforced by general norms of the society. Sellers break these contracts if they fail to give 
the buyer the good or service upon receiving payment, and buyers likewise break contracts 
if they appropriate goods or services without paying for them. Failing to fulfill these simple 
and short-term contracts is stealing in every society. 
Contracts are a more robust notion where transactions involve intertemporal 
stipulations--receive now, but pay later--and where risk, uncertainty, and insurance are 
significant considerations. Contracts that govern such transactions typically involve many 
more stipulations than do instantaneous, cash arrangements. Considerations of time and 
risk are universal components of financial contracts. 
STIPULATIONS IN FINANCIAL CONTRACTS 
Those of us who study informal finance are often amazed at the rich variety of 
arrangements we encounter in most countries. Sociologists and anthropologists have feasted 
on describing the enormous variety of these arrangements (e.g., Bouman; Firth and Yamey). 
Applying the analogy of clothing to contracts, informal finance is able to tailor contracts to 
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fit the individual dimensions, requirements, and tastes of a wide spectrum of lenders and 
borrowers. Stipulations in each contract can be adjusted to fit the idiosyncratic needs and 
desires of the parties involved. In contrast, formal finance processes contracts that are more 
standardized and less individually tailored. Formal intermediaries require borrowers and 
depositors to ''wear" contracts that are largely pre-made. 
Participants are able to form nearly limitless combinations of terms and conditions--
both explicit and implied--in financial contracts. At least eight types of stipulations can be 
identified with many permutations in each type. These include the amount of the loan, the 
term of the loan, how and when the loan is to be repaid, the interest payment involved, loan 
guarantees or collateral requirements, how loan transaction costs are shared, other explicit 
linked arrangements, and additional implied arrangements that are linked to the loan. 
Loan size 
The amount of money involved is typically the most prominent stipulation in loan 
contracts. If the loan and its repayment are in cash, the size of loan is denominated in 
money. If at least one side of the loan transaction is denominated in units of goods or 
services, the loan valuation problem is less straight forward. For obvious reasons, both 
borrower and lender generally avoid spending much time negotiating the terms and condi-
tions of small loans but typically expend more time on large loans. Likewise, contracts that 
deal with small loans usually involve fewer stipulations than those processing large amounts. 
Term of loan 
The period or term over which the agreement is in effect is another important 
contract element. It is common for lenders and borrowers to spend more time negotiating 
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a long-term loan and including a larger number of stipulations than they would in crafting 
a short-term contract. Both the lender and borrower see a loan for only a month as being 
quite different from an equal-sized loan for 12 months, for example. A sequence of 12 one-
month loans for 100 units of money would be of the same economic magnitude as a single 
12-month loan of 100 units of money, aside from the differences in transaction costs 
involved. 
Especially in informal finance, not all loan contracts specify when the loan is to be 
fully repaid--some contracts are incomplete or open-ended. An individual may borrow 
money from a relative, for example, with the implicit understanding that the loan will be 
repaid when the borrower is able to do so. These open-ended arrangements may be 
renegotiated and amended later when a specific time for repaying the loan is appended to 
the contract. In still other cases there may be an implicit understanding between borrower 
and lender that the time period of the loan can be renegotiated under certain conditions. 
Loan repayment 
Aside from loans among friends and relatives, most financial contracts include 
specifications about what form and when loan repayments are to be made. The loan may 
be transacted in cash or kind with repayment specifications calling for money, products, or 
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even services.2 If both sides of the transaction are done in kind there is no finance 
involved, although a barter loan is made.3 
Lenders and borrowers also have ample latitude in the specification of loan 
repayments. Some contracts require that the entire amount of the loan plus interest is due 
in one lump-sum payment at the end of the contract period. For both the lender and the 
borrower this pattern of loan repayment is quite different from one that specifies 1/52nd 
of the loan be repaid each week for a year. In the first case the borrower has effective use 
of the entire amount of the loan for a full 12 months, while in the second case the borrower 
has effective use of only half the total value of the loan for the full 12 months. 
A number of additional repayment patterns are found both in formal and informal 
financial contracts. Adjustments in these patterns have a major impact on the perceived 
worth of the contract. Loans, for example, that require rice farmers to make daily payments 
for fertilizer bought on credit would usually result in a mismatch with their cash flows and, 
thus, would be viewed as an undesirable contract by borrowers. Similar repayment terms 
on loans made to individuals who sell commodities daily in central markets, however, might 
be viewed as satisfactory arrangements by both lender and borrower. 
2Loans that are made and repaid in cash, loans that are made and repaid partly in cash 
and partly in kind, and various barter arrangements are often partial substitutes. Two 
farmers may decide to lend and borrow labor from each other through a labor sharing 
relationship, for example, instead of borrowing money to pay for purchased labor. In the 
same sense, crop-sharing arrangements are also substitutes for cash loans. 
3The main distinction between a loan that involves only barter and a loan that involves 
cash is the additional risk and uncertainty that changes in the purchasing power of money 
pose for financial transactions. 
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Interest rates 
Understandably, the lender's compensation for making loans and the payments 
borrowers must make for the privilege of borrowing are also important specifications in loan 
contracts. Both lender and borrower interpret a loan that carries an interest rate of 1 
percent per month as being something quite different from one that carries rates of 10 
percent per month. There is a large variety of interest rate options. These include simple 
interest, compounded interest, interest payments that are discounted in advance, add-on 
interest, and level payments pegged to the initial amount of the loan. The clarification of 
interest specifications is further complicated by various types of interest rates, such as 
nominal rates that ignore changes in overall price levels, real rates of interest that reflect 
adjustments for price changes, hidden interest charges, and effective rates that take into 
consideration interest paid, compared to principal outstanding. 
The payments made for loans, especially in Islamic countries, may avoid using explicit 
interest by calling the payments dividends, mark ups, or shared profits from jointly financed 
operations. 
Loan ~arantees and sanctions 
Other important specifications in financial contracts are the guarantee or collateral 
involved and the types of sanctions that might be applied in case of default. A loan that 
involves a hand shake as a guarantee is something quite different from one that requires 
pledging collateral worth several times the value of the loan. In some cases the borrower 
may lose the use rights of the collateral pledged through pawning. This may include 
borrowing from a pawnshop in Sri Lanka, pawning use of cocoa trees in Ghana, or pawning 
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paddy land in Thailand. In other cases contracts involve mortgages that place a lean against 
pledged property but allow the borrower to continue to use pledged assets. In still other 
cases, third parties, including groups, may be asked to guarantee all or part of a loan. 
Implied guarantees and informal sanctions are prominent in informal finance. 
Borrowers may strive to repay loans from sources they view as providing high quality and 
dependable services. In contrast, they may assign less priority to repaying loans made by 
government-owned agricultural development banks that provide undependable and low 
quality services. The denial of access to future loans is a more powerful informal sanction 
for the first type of lender than for the second. 
Each time borrowers take loans they essentially pledge their creditworthiness in the 
loan contract. Borrowers who default forfeit their creditworthiness, at least in the judge-
ment of lenders who suffer the default. In the small and highly personalized societies that 
typify the life of poor people in most low-income countries, a failure to repay one lender 
can result in an individual losing most borrowing privileges. The ability of the lender to 
exercise a range of informal sanctions--including extra-legal force--is an important aspect of 
informality. 
The provision of loan guarantees may impose costs on both borrowers and lenders. 
This includes the expenses involved in obtaining documents needed to mortgage property 
or gifts and payments made to individuals who co-sign loan contracts. In self-help groups 
members may be required to attend periodic meetings that impose opportunity costs on 
them as a way of forming mutual trust that substitutes for more tangible loan collateral. 
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Cumbersome legal procedures in some countries make it costly--sometimes virtually 
impossible--for lenders to legally retrieve assets pledged as collateral on defaulted loans. 
Under these circumstances lenders compensate by physical force to access collateral, or 
adjust other stipulations in loan contracts to offset judicial shortcomings.4 
Distribution of loan transaction costs 
Transaction costs are important features in many loans and they affect behavior of 
both lender and borrower. These costs may be either implicit or explicit. One lending 
procedure may impose relatively high loan tral1Saction costs on borrowers, while another 
procedure might result in lenders absorbing most of these costs. In general, informal 
finance is transacted in clients' homes, their place of work, their neighborhoods, or where 
they shop. In contrast formal financial transactions usually occur on the premises of the 
financial intermediary--the client is forced to come to the bank. 
The distribution of these costs among the participants is an important stipulation in 
financial contracts. Peddlers who sell items on credit door-to-door in rural areas of the 
Philippines, for example, may stipulate they will deliver merchandise and then return daily 
or weekly to collect loan payments, thus absorbing most transaction costs. In contrast, 
individuals in Guatemala who live far from town may be forced to visit a bank six or seven 
times to negotiate loans, to receive disbursements, and then to repay their loans. Such 
procedures result in borrowers incurring substantial transportation costs and lost-work time, 
while lenders have relatively little cost in effecting the loan. Likewise, farmers in Uganda 
4In a few countries governments have gone to the extreme of passing debt-relief 
legislation that nullifies informal loan contracts. 
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may wish to make deposits in distant banks but can only do so by incurring substantial 
transaction costs, in the form of lost work time and transportation costs, that are much 
larger than those experienced by deposit takers. 
Economists usually assume that interest payments are borrowers' costs of acquiring 
loans and that interest receipts are the benefit realized by lenders. This only holds, 
however, if there is no friction in the exchange in the form of transaction costs and if 
nothing else of worth accompanies the loan transaction. It is unlikely, for example, that 
rural peddlers who sell on credit in the Philippines or their clients make economic decisions 
solely on the basis of interest payments, particularly the borrowers. They are more likely 
to make these lending/borrowing decisions on the basis of total lending and borrowing costs, 
only part of which is comprised of interest payments. 
Tied transactions 
Many informal financial transactions are explicitly linked to the sale or purchase of 
inputs, products, or consumption goods. A farmer in Zaire may extend loans to workers as 
part of a labor-credit contract; a trader in Nepal may make advanced payments to rice 
farmers as part of a product-purchase agreement; farmers in Jamaica may give their 
products to peddlers on consignment for sale and agree to wait for later payment; a 
merchant in Egypt may sell chemical fertilizer to farmers on credit as a way of boosting 
sales; and a store owner in North East Brazil may allow customers to buy consumer items 
on credit. Offering credit is a device used by many merchants and traders to promote their 
main business activity--a way of competing. Explicit tying of these activities is, therefore, 
an important specification in associated loan contracts. 
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These explicit-tied arrangements include a number of variants. Some loans may 
involve no interest payment, but require sellers to accept concessionary prices for their 
products or services, or for buyers to pay above-market prices for products or services. In 
other cases, where one side of the financial transaction involves physical goods, specifica-
tions in contracts may require one of the parties to absorb the risk of product price change. 
In still other cases, the contract may involve other side-agreements that benefit or cost 
either borrowers or lenders. For example, the ijon system in Indonesia and the dadon sys-
tem in Bangladesh involve traders making forward payments for rice crops before they are 
harvested, and in doing so agreeing to absorb harvesting costs and price change risks 
(Ghate; Partadireja). 
Implicit stipulations 
Many informal loans are embedded in multifaceted relationships that implicitly tie 
other activities to lending. These implicit stipulations are as varied as are relationships 
among people. The lender and borrower, for example, may feel obligated to attend social 
club meetings in Vietnam or South Africa to reinforce their relationships (Barton; Lukhele ). 
Members of informal savings clubs among Korean or Mexican immigrants in Southern 
California may participate in these groups because they build mutual trust and possibilities 
of borrowing or doing business both within and outside the group (Light, Kwuon and Zhong; 
Velez-Ibanez). Individuals in all countries may lend to friends or relatives with the unstated 
understanding that loans will be reciprocated should the need arise in the future (Platteau 
and Abraham). 
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In still other cases, such as in Colombia and Peru lenders may have patronal relation-
ships with their borrowers. This may include implicit understandings that the patron will 
intercede for the borrower in legal matters and in disputes with authorities. These implicit 
agreements in countries such as Niger may extent to the provision of loans in times of per-
sonal emergencies, to holding some of the borrower's funds for safe keeping, and to provi-
sion of food in times of disaster (Cuevas and Graham). In many cases, informal borrowing-
lending is only one of a number of interlaced activities that strengthen interpersonal 
relationships, facilitate exchange, and allow individuals to survive in uncertain environments 
(Mahoney). 
TRADE OFFS AMONG SPECIFICATIONS 
Lenders who craft loan contracts not only have a variety of specifications they can 
choose from, but they also have latitude for substituting one element in a contract for 
another. For example, one contract may have a low interest rate but involve procedures 
that transfer most loan transaction costs to borrowers; at the same time another contract 
may include high interest rates but impose few additional costs on borrowers. The same 
lender may also offer other contracts that contain moderate interest rates, more loan 
collateral, and a sharing of loan transaction costs between lender and borrower. 
Prudent lenders adjust loan specifications to the perceived creditworthiness of 
borrowers and to prevailing risks and uncertainties. An individual with a bad reputation will 
not be able to negotiate the same loan contract that a distinguished person might expect. 
Likewise, a new client will generally be offered a loan with specifications that are substan-
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tially different from a client who has previously dealt with the lender. Analogous contact 
distinctions will be made between borrowers who operate farms in drought prone areas 
compared to borrowers who have access to dependable irrigation. Similarly, those who wish 
to borrow large amounts for extended periods of time likely negotiate loan contracts that 
are quite different from individuals who request small loans for only several days. This 
differentiation of contracts is found in informal rotating savings credit associations in 
countries such as The Gambia, Mozambique, and Cameroon where new group members 
may be required to wait until late in the rotation cycle to receive their share of the funds. 
From the borrowers perspective, they may be willing to substitute relatively high 
interest rates for associated transaction costs that are modest and for linked implied 
agreements that the lender will provide additional loans in times of emergency--offering a 
credit reserve. Or, borrowers may be only willing to incur substantial transaction costs to 
secure a loan if the interest charge is modest and other tied services are viewed as desirable. 
PRODUCTS AND PRICES 
In the foregoing I argued that borrowers and lenders base their financial decisio~ 
on multifaceted contracts and that loan size and interest rates are only two of a number of 
specifications that are included in these financial products. For some people the interest 
payment may be a relatively minor consideration compared to other elements in the con-
tract, especially when loans are small and for short periods of time. Unfortunately, when 
economists apply their tools to interpreting differences in interest rates across financial 
markets, both formal and informal, they usually ignore these other specifications. Some 
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economist employ a morality model to "prove" exploitation exists in informal finance and 
cite differences in interest rates on loans made by formal and informal sources as proof of 
monopoly powers (e.g., Bhaduri; Sarap ). Other economists employ an economic efficiency 
model and cite differences in interest rates on loans as signs of fragmented financial markets 
that are inefficient in allocating funds among economic alternatives (e.g., Bardhan; 
McKinnon). 
I have reservations about using either the morality or the efficiency model to analyze 
informal finance. My first reservations is that interest rates often do not represent all of the 
perceived costs or benefits of either extending or obtaining loans. Second, in my opinion, 
it is an error to think of informal financial systems as producing homogeneous contracts. 
Instead, one might better think of heterogeneous contracts as being the norm of what is 
produced, especially in informal finance. 
What is the product? 
In making judgements abou~ the morality or efficiency of financial market activities 
it is vital to compare like with like. No one would argue a market was defective or abusive 
that assigned a lower price on a badly bruised, small apple than on a large, crisp and 
attractive apple. Virtually everyone would agree that these are two different products in the 
eyes of consumers, despite the fact that both fruits belong to the apple species. 
Part of the problem with both the morality and efficiency models lies in the definition 
of the product or service--the apples-oranges issue. One should not expect the price that 
a consumer is willing to pay for two goods to be the same unless, in the opinion of the 
buyer, the two goods provide equal utility: both apples are identical in quality and size, or 
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both oranges are similarly identical. The fact that a consumer is willing to pay a higher 
price for one fruit compared to the other based on perceived quality differences, says 
nothing about the structure of the apple and orange markets, that is, whether or not they 
involve monopoly power. 
A difference in price between two goods is not prima facie evidence proving the price 
of the more expensive good includes monopoly rents. These differences in prices may only 
reflect the additional satisfaction consumers expect to realize from one fruit compared to 
the other. Without additional information on the structure of the markets for apples and 
for oranges an economist can only deduce something about the ordinal preferences of 
consumers from such price information. We can only deduce that something is askew in the 
market for apples if at the same time and place two identical apples are sold for different 
prices: for example, a poor person paying a higher price than a rich person for identical 
apples. Perhaps we should apply the same logic to analyzing loans and in doing so, we must 
be careful to compare prices among contracts that are similar. 
Price of A Loan? 
Most economists think of price as an indication of the sacrifice people incur when 
they purchase a good. This notion of price is often equated with interest payments when 
economists make judgements about financial transactions. If contracts are the products 
handled by financial intermediation, it is not at all clear that the interest payments specified 
in the contract captures a major part of the sacrifice or benefit borrowers and lenders 
realize from the transaction, particularly in informal finance. Respective transaction costs 
increase the sacrifice incurred by borrowers and reduce the net benefits realized by lenders. 
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Likewise, other specifications in the agreement may increase or decrease the perceived 
benefits or costs associated with the contract. Generally, the smaller and shorter the term 
of the loan, the less important is interest payment in influencing the behavior of participants 
in loan contracts. 
As a minimum, interpreters of informal finance should focus on borrowing costs--
interest payments plus loan transaction costs--as determinants of loan demand. Since these 
transaction costs may not vary much with loan size, the borrowing costs are particularly 
important when evaluating loans that are small and for short term--the types of loans that 
are the bread-and-butter of informal finance. 
In most informal financial transactions interest payments are only part of the cost or 
benefit that borrowers and lenders experience. Economists error when they think of 
interest payments as being prices of loans and the only determinants of loan demand. We 
further error when we ignore the tremendous diversity in lending and associated 
arrangements and think of only the amount of money as being the "product" demanded. 
CONTRASTING CONTRACTS 
A brief description of two quite different loan contracts in a Latin American country 
may help to clarify my arguments. Variants of the first contract are commonly offered to 
urban street peddlers in this country. The second contract is one that a defunct agricultural 
bank often offered to operators of small- and medium-sized farms. 
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Peddler loans 
Street peddlers occasionally run short on liquidity to buy inventory such as cigarettes, 
candy bars, gum, and other impulse purchase items. A number of wholesalers in central 
markets provide these items on credit in the morning with repayment due by the next day. 
The average loan is only for the equivalent of $10US, the average term is for 24 hours or 
less, and a single repayment of $11US is specified. The typical interest charge is thus 10 
percent--an annualized rate of 3,650 percent. The loans are made with no physical colla-
teral, but borrowers understand that the "word will get around" and that they will likely lose 
access to most informal loans if they should default. Because these . lenders operate in 
central markets, close to where street peddlers operate, the lender absorbs virtually all loan 
transaction and collection costs. 
While lenders understandably tie loans to the purchase of their goods, they also share 
valuable business information with borrowers about what goods are selling well or poorly 
and also give their most valued clients first access to new goods. Loan agreements are 
flexible and most clients are able to renegotiate delays in loan repayment and may also ask 
wholesalers for other emergency loans. In some cases the lender may intercede as character 
witnesses when clients have difficulties with police. Overall, borrowers value their 
dependable and flexible relationships with these wholesalers, loan recovery rates are high, 
and there are few complaints among borrowers about lender behavior. 
A&Dcultural bank loans 
Until its demise the government owned Agricultural Bank provided small loans with 
the following characteristics: loan size was about $300US, a single payment at the end of six 
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months was required, and interest was 1 percent per month. Borrowers were often required 
to provide loan collateral in the form of a mortgage against property worth several times 
the value of the loan and most loan contracts also required co-signers. Procedures forced 
borrowers to visit the bank's urban office an average of five or six times to satisfy collateral 
requirements, fill out papers needed to request the loan, gain final approval of the loan, 
receive several loan disbursements, and finally to repay the loan. 
Unlike some informal lenders, the agricultural bank did not tie its loans to purchase 
of other goods or services, did not provide useful business information or advice to 
borrowers, and also did not make emergency loans on the spur of the moment. One did not 
have to interview many borrowers from the bank to hear grumbling about the quality of 
service, requests for bribes, the amount of paperwork, and late loan approval and 
disbursements. The ultimate demise of the Bank also proved it was not a durable or 
dependable source of financial services. 
There are few similarities among the stipulations written into peddler loans and the 
stipulations included in loan contracts issued by the Agricultural Bank. In terms of products, 
about the only thing they have in common is that they are both called loans. A huge variety 
of other loan contracts can be found in this country with specifications that lie between 
these two extreme examples. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Discussions about informal finance have been long on value judgements and horror 
stories and short on careful analysis. Applying the notion of contracts to informal financial 
activities may allow social scientists to clear away some of the fog that currently surrounds 
19 
this topic. It may also allow economists, sociologists, and anthropologists to integrate more 
of their work in this topic. Even more importantly, contracts may allow us to organize 
information in a manner that more closely resembles the way people actually make decisions 
about their participation in financial activities, both informal and informal. 
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